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Executive Summary
New Union Fly Fishermen's Federation, Inc. (NUFFF), the
appellant in this case, sued New Union Power & Electric Com-
pany (NUPEC), the appellee, for violating the Clean Water Act
(CWA). Alleging jurisdiction under section 505, the CWA's citizen
suit provision, NUFFF claimed NUPEC violated several permit
conditions in a permit EPA issued to it under section 402. Specifi-
cally, NUFFF sought to enforce against NUPEC's violation of the
permit's intake, flow, and non-contact cooling water discharges.
In this appeal, NUFFF seeks to overturn the District Court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of NUPEC. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency has filed an amicus brief supporting
NUFFF on some issues and supporting NUPEC on others.
NUPEC applied to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to renew its permit for an existing facility with modification
to accommodate a new generating unit that withdraws and dis-
charges water from the New River. NUPEC applied to the New
Union Department of Natural Resources (NUDNR) for state certi-
fication under section 401. In order to protect the New Union
River's use as habitat for fish propagation, NUDNR limited
NUPEC's withdrawal and discharge of water to four million gal-
lons a day from September through May, and further limited it to
three million gallons per day from June through August. EPA in-
cluded these limits in the new permit and adjusted the permit's
flow limitation accordingly.
NUPEC violated the intake, flow, and discharge conditions
for half of the year during each year of operation, and it violated
all three conditions every day during the summer season each
year. NUDNR assessed penalties of $1,000 per day for the intake
violations occurring from September through May, but it did not
assess any penalties for those violations occurring in the summer
months, nor did it assess penalties for the flow or discharge viola-
tions. A NUDNR official's affidavit explained that no penalties
were assessed during the summer months because electricity de-
mand peaked during that time, the state lacked adequate generat-
ing capacity, and NUDNR had a policy of encouraging electricity
generation during the summer months.
At trial, NUFFF sought to enforce against all those violations
that NUDNR did not penalize in its enforcement action. NUFFF
also sought an injunction from further violations. The District
Court awarded summary judgment to NUPEC. The court found
[Vol. 21
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section 505 does not authorize citizens to enforce state imposed
limitations in CWA permits that are more stringent than or be-
yond the scope of the federal Act. It also found NUDNR's enforce-
ment actions against NUPEC deprive citizens of their
enforcement authority under section 309(g)(6), which bars citizen
suits seeking penalties where a state has diligently prosecuted
those same violations under comparable state law. The District
Court determined that the intake and non-contact cooling water
discharge conditions were based on state law that was beyond the
Act's scope. The court also held that principles of federalism
barred NUFFF from enforcing those permit conditions based on
state law. NUPEC successfully persuaded the court that permit-
ting citizens to enforce such conditions would deprive states' of the
discretion to enforce their own laws when deemed necessary or
appropriate.
The District Court also held that section 309(g)(6) bars citi-
zens from enforcing against violations occurring during the same
period that was already subject to a state enforcement action, and
it also bars citizens from seeking injunctions against those viola-
tions. The court deferred to the state's decision to enforce against
some violations and not others, reasoning that it was within the
state's discretion to balance its water quality laws against its en-
ergy needs. Although it did not need to reach the issue, the court
did address whether the intake, flow, and discharge violations oc-
curring on any given day constituted one or more violations of the
CWA. Interpreting section 309(g), which provides for the assess-
ment of daily penalties against violations, the court concluded
that daily penalties are assessed against each act or omission that
causes the violations in a given day, not the number of conditions
that are violated daily as the result of a single act or omission.
The court rejected the notion that 309(d) permitted penalties
against each condition violated in a given day, fearing permit
writers would be inclined to restate the same condition under sev-
eral iterations, allowing for the assessment of penalties in excess
of the congressionally stated maximum.
This Court must decide four issues. First, the Court must de-
cide whether the District Court erred in holding citizens may not
enforce against violations of state-imposed conditions that are
more stringent than or beyond the scope of the CWA, which EPA
included in a CWA permit because the state imposed the condi-
tions through state certification under section 401. NUFF argues
the CWA's purpose and language does authorize citizens to enforce
2004] 365
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against any conditions in a CWA permit, whether or not those con-
ditions are more stringent than or exceed the Act's scope. NUPEC
of course defends the district court's decision on the ground that to
decide otherwise is an impermissible interference with a state's
discretion to determine when and how to enforce its own laws.
EPA supports NUFFF in so far as citizens are authorized to en-
force more stringent conditions, but EPA argues against including
conditions which exceed that Act's scope in citizen enforcement
authority.
Second, this Court must decide whether intake, summer
month flow, and non-contact cooling water discharge limitations
are in fact more stringent than or exceed the scope of the Act.
Whether these conditions are more stringent than or beyond the
scope may determine, in part, whether NUFFF can enforce them,
if this Court determines citizens have no authority to enforce ei-
ther more stringent conditions or those exceeding that Act's scope.
NUFFF argues that these conditions are the kind of limitations
the CWA regulates, while NUPEC argues that all three conditions
are beyond that Act's scope. EPA argues intake limitation in this
permit exceeds that Act's scope, the summer flow limitations are
more stringent, enforceable permit conditions, and the discharge
conditions duplicate the flow conditions.
Third, this Court must decide whether the District Court
erred in interpreting section 309(g)(6) to bar citizens from seeking
civil penalties and injunctive relief where the state has already
assessed penalties against some of those violations under compa-
rable state law. NUFFF and EPA argue the plain language of sec-
tion 309(g)(6) does not bar citizen suits seeking injunctive relief
against future violations, nor does it bar NUFFF from seeking
penalties against those violations the state did not penalize.
NUPEC argues the district court's decision is proper because to
decide otherwise would deny the appropriate level of deference to
the state's own enforcement decisions.
Finally, this Court must determine whether the District
Court erred in finding that when a single act or omission violates
several conditions in a CWA permit, there is a single violation of
the permit. Both NUFFF and EPA contend the district court mis-
interpreted the statute, arguing that the statute assesses daily
penalties against each condition violated. NUPEC argues a single
act or omission, which leads to multiple permit violations on a
given day, constitutes a single violation for assessing penalties.
[Vol. 21366
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Suggested Questions for Judges
Issue 1
Is there a difference between conditions that are more stringent
and those that are beyond the scope of the CWA? Are the distinc-
tions between "more stringent" and "beyond the scope" mainly
semantic?
Does section 401 authorize states to impose conditions that are
less stringent than the CWA or more limited in scope than the
Act? Did Congress really intend to limit section 401 by the CWA's
regulatory scope?
What policy reasons suggest that citizens should not have author-
ity to enforce more stringent conditions? What about those condi-
tions that are beyond the scope?
Is it appropriate for the court to determine what is more stringent
and what is beyond the scope? Should EPA make this determina-
tion? Should the state make this determination? What legal stan-
dards should courts apply to determine whether a standard is
more stringent or greater in scope?
Should the court defer to a state's enforcement discretion when
the state has commandeered federal law to implement is own
goals? Should the court still defer to that decision when the fed-
eral law gives citizens the right to sue? Would allowing citizens to
enforce more stringent federal permit conditions undermine the
value and efficacy of state issued permits?
If section 401 predates the CWA, why should its incorporation into
the Act limit its effect? Does its incorporation limit its reach by
implication? Is there any distinction between standards imposed
under section 401 and section 402? Should there be?
Is there any suggestion in the CWA that EPA has the authority to
regulate a facility's activities, not just its discharges, if those ac-
tivities affect the Nation's waters?
Issue 2
Do intake, flow, and non-contact cooling water discharge each reg-
ulate a separate stage in NUPEC's permitted process? Does each
of these parameters affect water quality?
If the CWA regulates discharges, what reasons support the inclu-
sion of intake and flow within the scope of the Act? If, as PUD No.
2004] 367
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1 concludes, activities can be regulated, are NUPEC and EPA cor-
rect to aver intake levels are beyond the scope of the Act?
Can each parameter be within the scope of the Act for some pur-
poses and not for others?
Because the CWA authorizes states to impose any standards nec-
essary to achieve water quality standards when certifying federal
permits, can courts really consider any parameter to be more
stringent than or beyond the scope of the Act?
Issue 3
Why should citizens have the right to seek injunctive relief
against the same violations a state has not enjoined based on im-
portant state interests? What are the policy reasons in support of
precluding citizens from seeking civil penalties but not injunctive
relief?
Does this citizen suit authority undermine the states' role as pri-
mary enforcers of the CWA? Is this consistent with the Act's pres-
ervation of state enforcement discretion?
Is the First Circuit's reasoning in North and South Rivers Water-
shed Association flawed? How? Was its reliance on the Supreme
Court's Gwaltney decision appropriate?
Is the First Circuit's rejection of plain language in deference to
state enforcement action consonant with constitutional principles
of federalism and the supremacy of federal law? Is the Ninth Cir-
cuit's rejection of deference towards state enforcement discretion
in favor of the plain language of the statute consonant with the
constitutional principles of federalism and the supremacy of fed-
eral law?
Is an action for injunctive relief duplicative of an enforcement ac-
tion for the same violations? Does a citizen suit seeking an injunc-
tion really duplicate a state's enforcement action? How?
Does allowing a citizen suit seeking injunctive relief against the
same violations a state has already assessed penalties against im-
permissibly interfere with state enforcement authority? Does al-
lowing a citizen suit seeking penalties against violations a state
has chosen not to enforce impermissibly interfere with state en-
forcement authority?
[Vol. 21368
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Issue 4
Should the plain language of the statute always persuade courts?
Should legislative history of the statute always persuade the
courts?
Are a permittee's due process rights violated when it can incur
multiple penalties for a single act? Are a permittee's due process
rights of fundamental fairness violated when the permittee had
notice of permit conditions and the opportunity to challenge those
conditions?
Does the permit writer ultimately control the amount of penalties
a violator potentially faces? Does the state, through section 401,
control the amount of penalties a violator potentially faces? Does
the CWA permit writing process itself encourage the inclusion of
arbitrary standards and conditions in permits?
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I. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING
THAT CITIZENS MAY NOT ENFORCE AGAINST
VIOLATIONS OF CONDITIONS THAT EPA
INCLUDED IN A CWA PERMIT BECAUSE
THE STATE CERTIFIED THE CONDITIONS
UNDER CWA § 401, WHEN THE STATE
REQUIREMENTS ARE MORE STRINGENT OR
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE ACT?
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
The Clean Water Act was created to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2003). Its basic prohibition makes it
illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants into navigable waters
without a permit. Id. § 1311(a). The Act establishes a federal per-
mitting process that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
administers and can delegate to states with approved programs to
control the discharge of pollutants. Id. § 1342. States with ap-
proved programs have primary enforcement authority over viola-
tors. Id. § 1370. However, the Administrator of the EPA also may
bring an enforcement action against violators of federally issued
permits or state-issued permits where the state has failed to en-
force. Id. § 1319(a)(3).
The Clean Water Act includes a provision that allows citizens
to enforce against violations of the Act. Section 505 authorizes
"any citizen" to bring an enforcement action against any person or
entity, including the United States and federal agencies, "who is
alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation," or
"an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation," or where the Administrator has
failed to perform her non-discretionary duties under the Act. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1365(a)(1), (2). Citizens can seek injunctive relief and
the imposition of civil penalties. Id.
The Supreme Court views the citizen suit provision as a com-
plement to agency enforcement as opposed to a replacement for it.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S.
49, 60 (1987). In order to initiate a suit, an interested citizen
must first provide sixty days notice to the Administrator, the
state, and the alleged violator informing all of what standard, lim-
itation, or order is being violated. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1). This
provision provides the Administrator with the opportunity to com-
mence her own enforcement action and encourage her to do so.
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See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 79-80 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730.
Citizens can sue to enforce an alleged violation of an "effluent
standard or limitation" established under the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1). The citizen suit provision defines an enforceable ef-
fluent standard or limitation under the CWA as, inter alia, an "ef-
fluent limitation or other limitation" under section 301, a permit
condition under section 402, and state certification under section
401. Id. § 1365(f). This provision does not expressly authorize cit-
izen suits to enforce water quality standards established under
section 303 of the Act; however, permit conditions implement
water quality standards, and courts may enforce against viola-
tions of permit conditions. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City
of Portland, 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995), discussed infra.
B. STATE CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 401
1. The purpose of section 401.
Section 401 requires applicants for federal permits or licenses
for activities that may result in discharges into navigable waters
to obtain state certification from the state in which the discharge
originates to ensure that the discharges do not violate the Act, in-
cluding water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The fed-
eral permitting or licensing authority may not issue the permit or
license if the state denies certification. Id. State certification
must include "any effluent limitations and other limitations"
under the CWA or any state law requirement and these limita-
tions become enforceable conditions of the federal license or per-
mit. Id. § 1341(d); see also S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 69 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3735 (explaining that state
certification becomes an enforceable condition of the federal per-
mit or license).
The Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of
1970 amended the previous act, the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, to add state certification requirements. See Pub. L. No.
91-224, § 21(b), 84 Stat. 91 (1970). Before the CWA, water pollu-
tion control focused on ambient water quality standards. Presi-
dent Nixon issued an executive order requiring federal activities
to stop contributing to water pollution. Exec. Order No. 11,288, 31
Fed. Reg. 9,261 (July 7, 1966). Initially, section 401 required state
certification of a federally issued license or permit for any activity
likely to discharge into waters of the United States to ensure that
2004]
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"such activity will be conducted in a manner that will not reduce
the quality of such waters below applicable Federal or State or
local water quality standards." H. Rep. No. 91-127, pt. 2, § 3
(1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2691. The purpose of sec-
tion 401, as amended and incorporated into the CWA, is to make
the section consistent with the CWA's focus on the elimination of
pollutants through enforceable effluent limitations by ensuring
that any federally-issued permit or license complies with a state's
effluent limitations and monitoring requirements. S. Rep. No. 92-
414, at 69 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3735. The
amendment also "makes clear that any water quality require-
ments established under State law, more stringent than those re-
quirements established under the Act, also shall through
certification become conditions on any Federal license or permit."
Id. Thus, the state may bar the federal permitting or licensing
authority from issuing the applicant's permit if the discharges fail
to meet state law requirements, including those state require-
ments that are more stringent than those imposed under the
CWA.
2. Section 303 water quality standards as a component of
state certification.
As already stated, section 401 provides the states with the op-
portunity to impose on federal permits and licenses conditions
necessary to comply with states' water quality standards. Section
301 of the Act requires not only that pollutants cannot be dis-
charged without permits, but the permits must include "any more
stringent [state law] limitation, including those necessary to meet
water quality standards. . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). Water
quality standards augment technology-based effluent limitations
to ensure the maintenance of water quality despite permitted dis-
charges of pollutants. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Cal. ex rel. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976).
Section 303 establishes the policies and procedures applicable
to adopting and implementing water quality standards. See 33
U.S.C. § 1313. It requires states to designate uses for their water
bodies, establish criteria necessary to-preserve those uses, and re-
view those uses at least once every three years, following the
guidelines established under section 304 and including criteria for
toxic pollutants listed under section 307. Id. §§ 1313(c)(1), (2).
Designated uses must at least meet the goal that waters be fisha-
ble and swimmable, as required by the Act. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
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Criteria are the maximum levels of pollutants allowed to pro-
tect the designated use. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). Criteria
can be "expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narra-
tive statements, representing a quality of water that supports a
particular use." 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (2003). States can adopt
more stringent water quality standards, see 33 U.S.C. § 1370, and
these more stringent standards become enforceable permit condi-
tions through the section 401 state certification process. Id.
§ 1341(d); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a) ("As recognized by section
510 [33 U.S.C. § 13701 of the Clean Water Act, States may develop
water quality standards more stringent than required by this reg-
ulation."). Congress intended to provide states with the opportu-
nity to ensure that any federally-permitted discharges under a
section 402 CWA permit would be at least as strict as state re-
quirements to meet water quality standards under section 303. 92
Cong. Rec. 33,698 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie). Indeed,
when a state certifies the applicant's proposed activities, it must
state with "reasonable assurance" that the activity will not jeop-
ardize water quality standards, and it must include any condi-
tions "necessary or desirable" concerning the discharge's effects.
40 C.F.R. §§ 121.2(a)(3), (4).
The interrelationship between state certification and water
quality standards is clear. When an applicant seeks a federal li-
cense or permit for some activity likely to cause a discharge into a
state water body, the state can require the federal licensing or
permitting authority to include in the permit any legal require-
ments under state law to achieve water quality standards, even if
those standards are more stringent than what the CWA requires.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1370. Once those conditions are part of a
section 402 permit to regulate the discharges, they are enforcea-
ble. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(i), 1319. However, that raises the question
whether a state requirement that is more stringent than the CWA
requires is beyond the scope of the Act. If it is beyond the scope of
the CWA, the question becomes whether it is enforceable under
the CWA. Additionally, a question concerning who can enforce
those provisions has also surfaced.
More important to this case is the open question of whether
the CWA circumscribes state certification or whether its applica-
tion extends beyond the Act. If the latter is so, what constitutes a
condition that is beyond the scope of the CWA is irrelevant when
dealing with conditions placed in a permit under state certifica-
tion. This question arises out of the fact that section 401 predates
3732004]
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the CWA. It existed before the creation of the Act's regime of regu-
lations and limitations. When Congress amended section 401 to
incorporate it into the CWA, it failed to clarify whether conditions
imposed under section 401 are now limited to those conditions and
limitations the Act contemplates.
3. The distinction between more stringent requirements and
requirements that are beyond the scope of the CWA.
As with certification, states with approved permit programs
may include in permits they issue conditions more stringent than
those required by the Act. 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i)(1). In fact, the
EPA has also determined that states may include in their own
permits conditions that exceed the scope of the Act. Id.
§ 123.1(i)(2). However, the EPA has also determined that any
conditions in state-issued permits that are beyond the scope of the
Act are not part of the federally-approved program. Id. This
means that citizen suits brought under section 505 cannot enforce
such permit conditions in state-issued permits. The EPA has pro-
vided examples of what may be considered more stringent as op-
posed to beyond the scope. A state requirement that persons
discharging into publicly-owned treatment works could do so only
with a permit would be beyond the scope of federal law since the
CWA exempts those discharging into treatment facilities from ob-
taining a permit to do so. 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i); see 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(b)(1)(A)(ii), 1317(b). EPA offers as an example of what
may be considered more stringent a state's requirement that more
prompt notice be supplied when an upset has occurred. 40 C.F.R.
§ 123.25(a). While this may seem relatively straightforward, the
courts have not had such an easy time with this concept.
At least one court has held that a permit condition that ex-
ceeds the CWA's scope is enforceable. In Connecticut Fund for the
Environment v. Raymark Industries, Inc., the court held that a
state could impose effluent conditions in a permit issued for a dis-
charge into a man-made lagoon where wastewater was held and
treated prior to being released into navigable waters. 631 F.
Supp. 1283 (D. Conn. 1986). Although a treatment lagoon such as
this is not a navigable water of the United States, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7), the court held that since the condition was part of a
state-issued permit under section 402(b), and the citizen suit pro-
vision under section 505 authorizes citizens to enforce any permit
condition, the court had jurisdiction to enforce this permit provi-
sion. Raymark, 631 F. Supp. at 1285.
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The Ninth Circuit endorsed this view in holding that citizens
are authorized to enforce water quality standards included in a
state-issued permit. Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Port-
land, 56 F.3d 979, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1995). In Northwest Environ-
mental Advocates, the court found that a broad narrative permit
condition prohibiting any discharges that would violate the state's
water quality standards was, under the plain language of the citi-
zen suit provision, an enforceable permit condition under the
CWA. Id. at 988; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6). The court relied
on the legislative history, stating, "citizens are granted authority
to bring enforcement actions for violations of ... any condition of
any permit issued under section 402." Id. at 987 (quoting S. Rep.
No. 92-414, at 82 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3747) (alteration in the original). Rounding out its discussion of
what comprised enforceable permit conditions under the citizen
suit provision, the court cited Raymark for the proposition that
conditions exceeding the scope of the Act are enforceable. Id. at
988-89.
Unfortunately for us, the Ninth Circuit never distinguished
the facts of Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Company, 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), when it determined that
Portland's broad narrative standard was enforceable. In Eastman
Kodak, the Second Circuit held that citizens could not enforce a
provision in a state-issued permit prohibiting the discharge of any
pollutant not specifically addressed in the permit because this
condition exceeded the scope of the CWA. 12 F.3d at 359-60. The
issue was whether the citizens sought to enforce an effluent stan-
dard or limitation imposed under the CWA or a state-imposed con-
dition. The court relied on the EPA's interpretation of the scope of
the permitting scheme, stating, "polluters may discharge pollu-
tants not specifically listed in their permits so long as they comply
with the appropriate reporting requirements and abide by any
new limitations when imposed on such pollutants." Id. at 357.
The state sought to require reporting of pollutants that did not
have enforceable effluent limits in the permit; therefore, this con-
dition was not an effluent limitation imposed under the CWA.
Pointing to the regulations that define conditions of greater
scope as not part of the federally approved program, see 40 C.F.R.
§ 123.1(i)(2), the court concluded that citizens could not enforce
this permit provision under section 505. 12 F.3d at 359. The
state's condition was outside the scope of the Act because it ex-
ceeded this limitation inherent in the permitting scheme. Id. at
2004] 375
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358-59. Or, was it more stringent? The court blurred this distinc-
tion, stating that more stringent conditions could be enforced by
the state or the EPA, but not by citizens because section 505(f)(6)
restricts standing to effluent limitations included in the permit.
Id. at 358. By interpreting the regulations to mean more strin-
gent permit conditions necessarily exceed the scope of the CWA,
the court concluded citizens have no standing to enforce such con-
ditions under the federal Act. Id. at 360.
This treatment of "more stringent" and "greater scope" as the
same thing has lead to further confusion. One court relied on
Eastman Kodak to determine that citizens could not enforce per-
mit conditions restricting the discharge of settleable solids be-
cause the state imposed the standards under state law, the
standards were more stringent than federal standards, and they
therefore exceeded the scope of the CWA. Long Island
Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27
F. Supp. 2d 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Conversely, another court held
that citizens could sue under section 505 to enforce flow limits
written into a state permit because such limits, while more strin-
gent, were not beyond the scope of the Act because they appeared
in the original EPA-issued permit. Coalition for a Livable West-
side v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 92 Civ. 9011, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1955 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1998).
Other decisions distinguished Eastman Kodak because the
conditions citizens sought to enforce were merely more stringent,
rather than exceeding the scope of the Act; therefore, citizens
could enforce those conditions. See Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp.
2d 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding that citizens can enforce stricter
state standards written into a permit to protect water quality);
Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
953 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that CWA expressly
contemplates state-imposed stricter standards, and citizens can
enforce such standards to further the CWA's goals). Cf Gill v.
LDI, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (stating it is the
Ninth Circuit rule that state standards included in permits may
be enforced through citizen suits). These decisions are consistent
with the Supreme Court's statement that section 505(f)(6) permits
citizens to enforce any permit standards and limitations, even if
they are the more stringent standards imposed by states under
section 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 426 U.S. at 223-24.
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A pivotal case determining the scope of a state's authority
under section 401 is PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. City of Ta-
coma, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). In PUD No. 1, a utility company re-
quired a federal license from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to build a hydroelectric facility. 511 U.S. at 709. Be-
cause the operation of this facility was likely to cause discharges
into a river, the applicant had to obtain state certification under
section 401. Id. The state imposed minimum stream flow require-
ments to protect the water quality standards set for the river. Id.
The applicant sued, claiming that the imposition of conditions to
protect water quality standards exceeded the scope of the state's
authority under section 401 because the state was trying to put
limits on the applicant's activities rather than its discharges. Id.
at 711.
The Court held that the state had authority under section 401
to impose conditions that limited the applicant's activities as well
as its discharges. Id. at 712. The Court found that the text of
section 401(d) referred to the applicant as opposed to the dis-
charge, allowing states to impose not only effluent limitations but
also other limitations required to achieve water quality standards.
Id. at 711-12. This statutory interpretation was consistent with
the EPA's own interpretation of section 401 as requiring that the
activity itself will not violate water quality standards. Id. at 712
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3)). Thus, the state's limits, imposed
under state water quality standards, adopted as required by sec-
tion 303, were within the scope of the state's authority under sec-
tion 401. Id. at 713.
The weight of the cases above tend to support the notion that
more stringent state-imposed conditions are enforceable through
citizen suits while those conditions beyond the scope of the Act
will not be enforceable. The issue in this case presents an even
narrower question. While it may be difficult to discern what is
clearly a standard that exceeds the scope of the Act rather than
one that is merely more stringent, whether that distinction should
even apply to state standards imposed under section 401 rather
than section 402 is unclear.
20041 377
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C. THE ARGUMENTS THE PARTIES WILL PRESENT
1. NUFFF will argue that any permit condition is
enforceable under section 505.
NUFFF will argue that the construction and purpose of the
CWA necessarily authorizes citizens to enforce conditions in EPA-
issued permits imposed by states through the certification pro-
cess, and the case law supports this position. The plain language
of the statute provides for citizen enforcement of standards im-
posed under section 401. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6). The statute
clearly contemplates state standards more stringent than those
required by the Act. Id. § 1370. The statute also authorizes states
to impose through certification any conditions necessary to
achieve water quality standards. See id. § 1341(a)(1). The intent
behind section 401 is to ensure that states have the opportunity to
protect their water quality standards when another federal
agency is involved in permitting or licensing. Congress also in-
tended that citizens be able to enforce any permit conditions. See
legislative history, discussed supra. Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that citizens have the authority to enforce those stan-
dards imposed under section 401 that go beyond the scope of the
CWA.
The case law bolsters this argument. The Supreme Court rec-
ognized that activities, as opposed to only discharges, must neces-
sarily be regulated in order to protect water quality standards,
and states have the authority to impose these standards through
the state certification process. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. While
the Second Circuit may have blurred the distinction between more
stringent standards and those standards beyond the scope of the
Act in Eastman Kodak, the Ninth Circuit rejected this position
outright in Northwest Environmental Advocates. See Atl. States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir.
1993); Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979
(9th Cir. 1995). The majority of the courts have adopted this posi-
tion as the more persuasive approach to this problem. This dis-
tinction has no bearing on section 401, however, since this
provision itself extends beyond the scope of the CWA by regulating
activities that other federal agencies license or regulate.
NUFFF will also argue that 40 C.F.R. section 123.1(i)(2) is
inapplicable to permit conditions imposed under section 401. Spe-
cifically, NUFFF contends that extending this regulation to such
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permit conditions has no basis in the statute, that it may chal-
lenge such an interpretation now, and since it concerns the juris-
diction of the courts, that interpretation is not entitled to
deference. Section 301(b)(1)(C) mandates the implementation of
any more stringent limitations required by state law or any appli-
cable water quality standards established under the Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). This broad language suggests that more
stringent limitations are contemplated under the Act, and that no
conditions required to meet water quality standards are beyond
the scope of the Act.
Further, the regulation on which Eastman Kodak relies, and
on which NUPEC has pegged its argument, is irrelevant. Title 40
C.F.R. section 123.1(a) expressly states that the scope and pur-
pose of the regulation is to specify EPA approval procedures under
CWA sections 318, 402, and 405(a). The regulation never refers to
state certification or section 401 because it does not apply to per-
mits issued by the EPA.
The regulatory history shows that the EPA had originally pro-
posed rules that expressly recognized that states may adopt stan-
dards that are more stringent or beyond the scope of the Act. 43
Fed. Reg. 37,083 (Aug. 21, 1978). In response to comments criti-
cizing this proposal, EPA amended the regulation to distinguish
between more stringent standards and standards that exceed the
scope of the Act for state permitting programs. 45 Fed. Reg.
33,378 (May 19, 1980). Nothing in this regulation or its history
suggests that state standards incorporated into EPA-issued per-
mits under section 401 are beyond the scope of the Act or are
unenforceable.
Even if EPA intended this result, this interpretation involves
the jurisdiction of the courts. By stating that state programs with
greater scope are not part of the federally- approved program,
there is no enforcement under the federal Act of such state pro-
grams. As a result, EPA takes away federal courts' jurisdiction to
hear such cases. "When Congress has 'established an enforcement
scheme' that gives a party 'direct recourse to federal court,' it is
'inappropriate to consult executive interpretations of the [jurisdic-
tion-conferring statute] to resolve ambiguities surrounding the
scope of [the party's] judicially enforceable remedy."' Murphy Ex-
ploration & Prod. Co. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 252
F.3d 473, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quotingAdams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,
494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990)).
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In Adams Fruit, injured migrant workers sued their employer
under a federal law protecting migrant workers, which created a
private cause of action against employers who intentionally vio-
lated the Act. 494 U.S. at 640-41. The employer argued that a
state workers compensation law preempted the federal law be-
cause it failed to explicitly state the preemptive scope, relying on
the Department of Labor's interpretation of the Act. Id. at 649.
The Court held that since Congress "expressly established the Ju-
diciary and not the Department of Labor as the adjudicator of pri-
vate rights of action arising under the statute," the Court owed no
deference to the department's interpretation. Id. Deference
under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), is applicable where there is an express delegation
of administrative authority, and there was none here concerning
the Act's enforcement provisions. Id. at 650.
Like the workers compensation law in Adams Fruit, the CWA
grants a cause of action to citizens, enforceable in the federal
courts. The Act does not delegate to the EPA authority to deter-
mine under what conditions citizens may file such citizen suits or
in what forum, but it does authorize the EPA to regulate how citi-
zens give notice of intent to sue. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). This
express delegation of authority to regulate notice removes any im-
plied delegation of authority to regulate other aspects of citizen
suits. When EPA interpreted the CWA to mean that standards
beyond the scope of the Act were not part of the federal program,
and thereby not subject to the citizen suit provision, it was deter-
mining that the federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear citizen
suits attempting to enforce standards that exceed the scope of the
Act. Unless the EPA has express Congressional authority to make
such determinations, the Court affords no deference to its inter-
pretation. Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 650.
NUFFF rejects any argument that section 401 allows states
through certification to impose standards only less stringent or
less comprehensive than the scope of the Act. Although section
401 predates the CWA, before the limitations and the scope of fed-
eral water pollution control were completely developed as embod-
ied in the CWA, NUFFF argues section 401's amendment and
incorporation into the CWA must make it consistent with the
CWA's goals and purpose. To find otherwise would defeat the
CWA's goals of returning the nation's waters to a fishable, swim-
mable condition, and it would contradict Congress' express inten-
tion that the CWA provide a floor for those limits while
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authorizing states to set more stringent limits. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1370. NUFFF also argues that permitting states to go beyond
the scope of the Act to preserve water quality standards is consis-
tent with the Act's protective and restorative goals.
2. NUPEC will argue that the Act precludes citizens from
enforcing conditions that are more stringent than or
exceed the scope of the Act.
NUPEC seems to adopt Eastman Kodak's interpretation of 40
C.F.R. section 123.1(i)(2), equating the terms "more stringent" and
"greater scope." NUPEC argues that the EPA interprets the CWA
to mean both more stringent state standards and broader state
standards are not within the federal program and are therefore
not enforceable under the Act's citizen suit provision. NUPEC
will contend that this interpretation is reasonable and should be
afforded deference under Chevron. NUPEC's own interpretation
of the regulation, however, appears flawed.
NUPEC argues the statutory interpretation embodied in 40
C.F.R. section 123.1(i)(2) applies both to conditions in state-issued
permits and to conditions in EPA-issued permits based on state
section 401 certification. If citizens could enforce broader stan-
dards in permits issued by EPA, the fact that citizens could not
enforce those same standards in a state-issued permit would
render permits issued by a state of lesser value and effectiveness
than EPA-issued permits. That undermines states' permitting
authority by allowing states to impose broader conditions in fed-
eral permits through certification, but not in their own permits.
Obviously, this is not what Congress intended. Approved state
permit programs have the same force and effect as federal per-
mits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The CWA's objectives include the goal
of delegating to states the role of implementing permit programs.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). If citizens can enforce broader standards in
federal permits, that diminishes states' authority to implement
and issue permits. This two-tier permit-issuing authority dimin-
ishes the value of state permits and runs counter to the goals of
the Act.
NUPEC will also argue that allowing citizens to enforce
broader federal permit standards deprives states of their discre-
tion to enforce their own laws in their own courts, disrupting con-
stitutional principles of federalism. Section 510 embodies the
constitutional requirement that states laws must be at least as
stringent as federal laws. 33 U.S.C. § 1370; U.S. Const. art. VI,
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§ 1, cl. 2. At the very least, state sovereignty means states retain
the right to decide when and how to enforce their own laws that
are more stringent than federal law. If citizens may sue in federal
court to enforce a state's own standards, the state is effectively
stripped of it sovereign discretion whether to enforce the stan-
dard. Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
In Ashoff, a citizen of California sought to enforce in federal
court a more stringent state standard regulating a solid waste dis-
posal site under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's
(RCRA) citizen suit provision. Id. at 410; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7002(a) (2000). California law did not provide for citizen suits in
state court; rather, it provided administrative remedies. Ashoff,
130 F.3d at 413. The court distinguished RCRA from the CWA,
finding that while the CWA expressly contemplated citizen en-
forcement of more stringent state standards, there was no such
provision in RCRA. Id. In determining Ashoff was barred from
bringing his suit in federal court, the Ninth Circuit expressed con-
cern that to allow otherwise would ignore California's decision to
provide a particular remedy as well as to insulate municipalities
from certain kinds of litigation, an unacceptable interference with
state sovereignty. Id. As with the Ashoff case, allowing citizens to
enforce state standards that exceed the scope of the Act would
inappropriately interfere with state sovereignty.
3. EPA will argue that citizens may enforce more stringent
standards, but they may not enforce standards beyond
the scope of the CWA.
EPA will argue that citizens may enforce more stringent stan-
dards, as contemplated by the statute, but there is no authority to
suggest that standards of greater scope imposed pursuant to state
certification are enforceable under the federal Act. First, its own
regulations consistently recognize the Act's express endorsement
in section 510 of state authority to impose more stringent condi-
tions whether in the context of state-issued permits or state certi-
fication. 33 U.S.C. § 1370; see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i)(1)
("Nothing in this part precludes a State from adopting or enforc-
ing requirements which are more stringent. . . ."); 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.53(e) (2003) ("State certification shall . . . include . . . any
conditions more stringent than those in the draft permit which the
State finds necessary to meet [sections 301 and 303]."); Id.
§ 131.4(a) ("States may develop water quality standards more
stringent than required by this regulation."); Id.
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§ 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(B)(5) (requiring permit writers to "[i]ncorporate
any more stringent limitations . .. under State law. . . ."); Id.
§ 233.1(c) (pertaining to section 404 dredge and fill permits,
"[n]othing in this part precludes a State from adopting or enforc-
ing requirements which are more stringent. .. ").
As consistent as EPA's recognition is of states' authority to
implement more stringent standards, the complete absence of any
regulation suggesting state standards that exceed the scope of the
CWA are enforceable as part of the federal program. In fact, the
EPA discusses standards beyond the scope only in the context of a
regulation explaining that such standards are not part of the fed-
eral program. The EPA contends that drawing this distinction is
not an exercise in interpreting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Rather, it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute's
regulatory reach, an interpretation well within its authority to
make and one that is due reasonable deference.
EPA will cite Murphy, a case about an oil and gas producer
who leased federal land for production and sued the Department
of the Interior (DOI) to expedite a refund of royalty overcharges
which was stalled in administrative proceedings. 252 F.3d at 476.
DOI argued the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
case because DOI's thirty-three month repayment deadline had
not yet run. Id. DOI based its reasoning on its regulatory inter-
pretation of a statutory provision requiring the Secretary to make
a final decision on any administrative proceeding within thirty-
three months from the date the proceeding began. The regulation
provided that DOI's failure to issue a decision within that period
was deemed a final decision in favor of the Secretary, and the ap-
pellant could seek review of that decision in federal court. DOI
construed this statute to mean it had thirty-three days from the
filing of an administrative appeal with the agency. Id. Since Mur-
phy had not yet filed an administrative appeal, the DOI argued,
the federal court had no jurisdiction.
The facts of Murphy are distinguishable from the circum-
stances in this case. In Murphy, the agency was interpreting a
specific statute conferring jurisdiction on a federal court. The
court did not have to examine whether Congress expressly spoke
on this issue, and if not, examine whether the agency's interpreta-
tion was reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. No deferential
analysis was required because the interpretation of such statutes
is "exclusively the province of the [federal] courts." Murphy, 252
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F.3d at 478 (quoting Ramey v. Bowsher, 9 F.3d 133, 136 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1993)).
EPA regulation 40 C.F.R. section 123.1(i)(2) does not inter-
prete any specific provision of the CWA conferring jurisdiction on
the federal courts. Rather, the regulation interpretes the regula-
tory reach of the CWA. As the agency charged with administering
the Act, it is in the best position to interpret the regulatory reach
of the Act. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. Specifically, the EPA
was interpreting the regulatory reach of the CWA's permitting
program. The statute charges EPA with issuing permits, approv-
ing state permit programs, and enforcing permit conditions. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342(a), (b). Congress has spoken directly on the
issue of the agency's responsibilities under the CWA, and EPA's
interpretation of the CWA's regulatory reach is reasonable, sup-
ported by the statute, and should be afforded deference. Although
EPA's determination may prevent citizens from enforcing stan-
dards in federal court, unlike Murphy, its interpretation does not
apply to a section conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, nor
is this regulation altering the conditions under which citizens can
seek redress in the federal courts. It is simply determining that
the Act does not regulate some standards in the first place.
Even though 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i)(2) does not expressly pertain
to CWA section 401, EPA argues the underlying policy, that condi-
tions greater in scope are not part of the federal Act, applies
equally to state certification. If states could impose broader stan-
dards through certification, but not through their own state per-
mitting programs, the two likely results run counter to the intent
of the Act. First, Congress intended states to remain the primary
enforcers of water pollution laws. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). States' dis-
cretion to exercise their enforcement authority may be under-
mined because citizens could sue to enforce states' broader
conditions where states may have chosen not to for policy reasons.
See Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1997) ("To
allow Ashoff to bring suit in federal court would effectively disre-
gard the choice that California has made. . . ."). States may even
be dissuaded from adopting stricter standards if they cannot
choose when and how those standards will be enforced. Id. Sec-
ond, if citizens could use a federal law to enforce broader state
standards in federal court, the EPA's regulatory role in interpret-
ing the federal Act will become superfluous as state-by-state stan-
dards mesh with and expand the original federal scheme. Not
only does this violate the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const. art.
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VI, § 1, cl. 2, but it eliminates judicially manageable standards
since the federal courts would no longer be able to look to the
agency for regulatory guidance. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
D. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CITIZEN SUITS
ENFORCING MORE STRINGENT STANDARDS, BUT IT DOES NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CITIZEN SUITS ENFORCING
STANDARDS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE ACT
This Court should find that a state's more stringent stan-
dards imposed through certification are included in the federal
program and, therefore, are subject to enforcement through citi-
zen suits brought under the CWA. "The starting point for inter-
preting a statute is the language of the statute itself." Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980). The CWA unequivocally recognizes a state's right to im-
pose more stringent standards than those included under the Act.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1370. Through its certification of fed-
eral licenses and permits, states may impose more stringent stan-
dards necessary to meet state water quality standards. Id.
§ 1341(a)(1). Once included in permits under section 401, those
conditions become enforceable permit standards. Id. § 1341(d).
Section 505(f)(6) expressly authorizes citizen suits to enforce certi-
fication conditions. Id. § 1365(f)(6). This statutory scheme re-
flects Congress' intent that a state's more stringent water quality
standards, once included in the permit, become enforceable condi-
tions. 92 Cong. Rec. 33,696 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
Where the EPA declines to enforce such federal permit conditions,
citizens may file suit instead. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2). This view is
entirely consistent with EPA regulations and the majority of the
case law. E.g., PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. 700; Northwest Envtl. Advo-
cates, 56 F.3d 979; United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d
96 (1st Cir. 1989).
The issue of whether state standards exceeding the scope of
the Act are enforceable under the Act's citizen suit provision is
more obtuse. First, EPA itself apparently believed at one time
that states' broader standards were enforceable under the CWA
when proposed rules stipulated that states may "operate pro-
grams with a greater scope than mandated by the Act," and that
such approved state programs operated "in lieu of the Federal pro-
gram .... " 43 Fed. Reg. 37,083. Reacting to comments it received,
the EPA never promulgated this regulation. See 45 Fed. Reg.
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33,378 (obliquely stating, "Most of the Comment [sic] included in
proposed § 123.1(f) regarding State programs with greater scope
of coverage than required by Federal law has been incorporated
into the regulation, § 123.1(k)(2) [today's § 123.1(i)(2)]."). Of
course, this provision dealt with state permit programs and makes
no mention of state certification.
Then there is the language and construction of the statute it-
self. The very function of state certification reaches out beyond
the CWA's permitting scheme with permits issued by either the
EPA or the state under an EPA-approved program. Applicants for
federal, not state, licenses or permits from federal agencies whose
activities "may result in any discharge into the navigable waters,"
must receive state certification that the discharge will comply
with state water quality standards as well as the broad require-
ments of section 301. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has determined that conditions imposed
under section 401 do not pertain only to the discharge, but also to
the activity causing the discharge. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. It
is reasonable to conclude that such a broad statutory provision,
which reaches outside of the Act to regulate the permitting pro-
cess of other federal agencies, endorses the notion that the federal
program implicitly recognizes state standards of greater scope.
Perhaps more compelling, however, is the broad language of
section 401(d), authorizing states to include "any other appropri-
ate requirement of State law" in the certification. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d). The breadth of this provision, embracing any state or
law or regulation, by its terms seems to reach beyond the CWA.
Section 401, which is effectively regulating non-CWA activities
that may have an affect of navigable waters, recognizes that some
laws and standards are going to be greater in scope than the stan-
dards set out in the Act itself. See id. The language of section
301(b)(1)(C), "any more stringent limitation.., established pursu-
ant to any State law or regulations," suggests that this reality is
necessary to achieve the goals of the Act itself. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(1)(C).
In this case, NUDNR certified NUPEC's federal permit, im-
posing seasonal flow restrictions to meet water quality standards
designed to protect New Union River's designated use for fish
propagation. The district court determined that the conditions
imposed were beyond the scope of the CWA; therefore, NUFFF
could not sue in federal court to enforce against violations of the
permit that New Union itself chose not to enforce. New Union had
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to balance two competing interests: protection of its waters and
adequate electricity supply for its citizens during the summer
months. Determining that citizens have authority under the CWA
to enforce a state's broader standards conflicts with another ex-
press statutory provision, that states are the primary enforcers.
Furthermore, such a result trumps state sovereignty.
Courts interpret conflicting provisions of a statute to avoid
unconstitutional results. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (citations omitted). In this
instance, the state chose not to enforce violations of summer flow
because of electricity demand. That is a decision our federalist
system prescribed by the Constitution entitles the state to make.
One might ask why the state imposed this condition on NUPEC in
the first place. However, there are always varying circumstances
calling for judgment. Allowing citizens access to federal court to
enforce a state's own law where the state may have had good rea-
son to refrain from enforcement runs counter to the constitution-
ally prescribed balance between federal and state interests. EPA
recognizes this federalist interest in its regulation identifying ap-
plicable state procedures as the appropriate means of challenging
limitations and conditions imposed under state certification. 40
C.F.R. § 124.55(e).
While not exactly on point, American Rivers, Inc. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), is
helpful in understanding how EPA and the courts have come to
view section 401. In American Rivers, Vermont and an environ-
mental group sued the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to enjoin it from striking permit conditions it considered
to be beyond the scope of the CWA. Id. Some of these conditions
included a requirement that the applicant provide canoe portage
on the facility's site along a river, that twenty-four hour fish pas-
sage be assured, and that the state could reevaluate the effects of
any significant changes in operations. Id. at 104.
The court did not determine whether these conditions ex-
ceeded the scope of the Act; rather, it held that FERC had no au-
thority to remove the conditions from the permit. Id. at 112. In so
holding, the court recognized the state's authority to impose any
conditions, and the state court was the proper forum for challeng-
ing the validity of those conditions. Id.; see also Roosevelt Campo-
bello Int'l Park Comm'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st
Cir. 1982) (stating, "The courts have consistently agreed with [the
EPA's interpretation in 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e)] that the proper fo-
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rum to review the appropriateness of a state's certification is the
state court," and federal courts and agencies have no authority to
review the validity of state law requirements). The court did not
say those conditions could not be enforced in federal court, and it
explicitly recognized that states could impose any conditions. Sec-
tion 505(f) authorizes citizens to enforce those conditions imposed
through state certification. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). While the state
courts are the appropriate fora to review state standards, once in-
cluded in a federal permit, those conditions are enforceable in fed-
eral court.
However, even if the CWA confers authority on citizens to en-
force broader state standards under the Act in federal court, this
Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The
Constitution extends federal judicial power to all cases "arising
under" the United States Constitution, laws, and treaties. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The laws citizens seek
to enforce, if beyond the scope of the federal Act, necessarily arise
under state law. Thus, when a case presents no "federal question"
for disposition, such as the applicability of a state standard under
state law, a federal court is without jurisdiction to hear the case.
See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S.
480, 496 (1983) (stating that a statute conferring federal jurisdic-
tion does not automatically create an action under federal law). It
is not difficult to ascertain that a state standard requiring canoe
portage implicates no federal interest, and the federal CWA does
not address these types of standards in its effort to control water
pollution. Thus, the Act's citizen suit provision does not extend to
state standards that clearly exceed the scope of the CWA.
This Court should find for NUFFF and EPA on the issue of
whether citizens can enforce under the CWA a state's stricter
standards imposed under section 401. This Court should find for
EPA and NUPEC on the issue of whether citizens can enforce
under the CWA a state's broader standards imposed under section
401.
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II. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE INTAKE, NON-CONTACT COOLING
WATER DISCHARGE, AND SUMMER-MONTH
FLOW LIMITATIONS IN THE NUPEC
PERMIT ARE MORE STRINGENT THAN AND
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE CWA?
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF WHAT THE CWA REGULATES
The CWA regulates discharges of pollutants from point
sources through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permitting scheme. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). In or-
der to achieve the objectives of the CWA, "any more stringent limi-
tation [than those required under the Act], including those
necessary to meet water quality standards" shall be written into
permits. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C); see also id. § 1342(a)(1)(A). Permit
writers include a state's more stringent conditions necessary to
achieve water quality standards in the NPDES or SPDES permit.
Id. 88 1342(a), (b). In this instance, New Union's more stringent
conditions were written into the permit because New Union in-
cluded them in its certification of NUPEC's permit. See id.
§§ 1341(a), (d).
The EPA is required, after consultation with the states, to re-
search and make available information explaining what measures
must be taken to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity" of the Nation's waters, including informa-
tion on the water quality criteria "necessary for the protection and
propagation of shellfish, fish, and wildlife for classes and catego-
ries of receiving waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2). Additionally, the
Administrator must review and approve state water quality stan-
dards and publish regulations to achieve water quality standards.
Id. §§ 1313(a), (b). The states must review their water quality
standards at least every three years and make appropriate revi-
sions to protect existing or newly designated uses. Id.
§ 1313(c)(2)(A).
Congress did not intend for the CWA's focus on water quality
to interfere with state allocation of water quantity. Section
510(2), entitled "State authority," states the policy that the Act is
not intended to interfere with states' rights or jurisdiction over
states' water bodies. Id. § 1370(2). In section 101(g), the Act ex-
pressly reserves states' authority to allocate water quantities be-
tween individual users. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). Congress amended
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the Act in 1977 to include section 101(g) as recognition of states'
historic rights to regulate water quantities while also recognizing
that "[1legitimate water quality measures authorized by ... [the
CWA] may at times have some effect on the method of water us-
age." 123 Cong. Rec. 39,212 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
Thus, section 101(g) was intended to prevent the undermining of
state water allocation systems, and to insure "that effects on indi-
vidual rights, if any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary
water quality considerations." Id.
Of particular concern in this case are permit conditions limit-
ing the amount of water the permittee can withdraw for use as
non-contact cooling water and limits on the flow, discharge, and
spent cooling water. See Exhibit 1. The CWA makes reference to
flow in section 304(f)(2)(F), requiring the EPA to develop informa-
tion to control pollution as a result of movement, flow, or circula-
tion changes brought about in waters as a result of flow diversion
facilities such as dams, levees, causeways, and channels. 33
U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F). Courts have construed this provision to
pertain only to nonpoint sources of pollution. See, e.g., Nat'l Wild-
life Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir.
1988). Subsequently, the Supreme Court construed this provision
to support its holding that it was appropriate for a state, through
state certification, to impose in a permit minimum stream flows to
protect water quality standards. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 719-20.
B. EPA REGULATIONS CONCERNING FLOW, INTAKE WATER, AND
NON-CONTACT COOLING WATER
1. Flow
EPA regulations address flow in a number of instances to
avoid dilution as a substitute treatment for the removal of pollu-
tants. Specifically, the regulations convert concentration limits
achievable by dilution to mass limits, which cannot be diluted. 40
C.F.R. §§ 122.44, 122.45. NPDES permit applications and pro-
gram requirements identify discharge flow as a quantifiable efflu-
ent characteristic. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21 (h)(4)(i)(I). Permit
applicants are also required to provide a description of flow fre-
quency as well as the occurrence and length of seasonal or inter-
mittent flow discharges. Id. § 122.21(h)(5). There are different
requirements for different facilities, but each type must address
flow. For instance, existing facilities must include in their appli-
cations descriptions of average flows, flow treatment, and inter-
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mittent or seasonal flows. See id. §§ 122.21(g)(3)-(4). As for a
source water's natural flow, new facilities designing intake struc-
tures must ensure that the intake does not exceed a certain
amount of a source's annual flow based on the amount of water
withdrawn. Id. § 125.84(b)(3)(i). There are also flow-reduction re-
porting requirements for new facilities with intake systems. Id.
§ 125.86.
2. Intake water
EPA regulations deal with intake water in two contexts: (1)
limiting discharges of pollutants where intake waters contained
pollutants, and (2) in constructing new intake facilities. When in-
take waters contain pollutants, permittees may be eligible for
credits to discharge those pollutants already existing in the in-
take. 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g) (net/gross provision). This follows
from the basic prohibition in the statute against the "addition" of
pollutants without, or in violation of, a permit and the fact that
the discharger does not add pollutants that are already present in
its intake waters. Id. § 122.44(i)(1)(iii).
There are a series of regulations concerning cooling water in-
take structures for new facilities. See 40 C.F.R. 125.1. EPA has
also proposed such regulations for existing facilities' intake struc-
tures, to be promulgated in 2003. National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System-Proposed Regulations to Establish Require-
ments for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing
Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122 (Apr. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 125). EPA developed these regula-
tions under the authority of section 316(b), which requires "the
location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake
structures [to] reflect the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact[s]." 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
The adverse environmental impacts comprise the impinge-
ment and entrainment of fish and fish eggs that result as intake
systems withdraw water. National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System: Regulations Addressing Cooling Water Intake Struc-
tures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 125). The new facilities
regulations were designed to "preserve aquatic organisms and the
ecosystems they inhabit in waters used by cooling water intake
structures...." Id. As already mentioned, intake structures de-
signs must apply proportional flow limitations to ensure the in-
take does not exceed five percent of the annual mean flow of the
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source water. 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(b)(3)(i). In the case of a river, a
facility may not withdraw more than five percent of a freshwater
river flow to ensure entrainment is limited to no more than five
percent of entrainable organisms in the river. 66 Fed. Reg. at
65,277. Minimizing entrainment will not only preserve aquatic
life, but it will also enhance commercial and recreational fishing
activities in those affected waters. Id.
The new facilities regulations achieve their goals through the
implementation of technologies to reduce intake structure capac-
ity, velocity of withdrawals, and impingement prevention systems.
40 C.F.R. § 125.84(b). The regulations also expressly recognize
states' rights under sections 401 and 510 of the CWA to include
more stringent requirements concerning the design, location, con-
struction, and capacity of intake structures necessary to achieve
water quality standards. 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(e). This includes any
requirements concerning designated uses, water quality criteria,
and anti-degradation. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,277-278 (citing PUD
No. 1 for the proposition that states are authorized to include any
more stringent requirements necessary under state law and con-
sistent with the restorative goals of the Act).
3. Non-contact cooling water
Regulations concerning non-contact cooling water involve dis-
charge calculations. NPDES permit applicants must identify any
type of discharged waste including non-contact cooling water as
well as any cooling water additives the facility plans to use. 40
C.F.R. § 122.21(h)(3). States desiring to implement their own per-
mit programs must enter into a memorandum of agreement with
EPA acknowledging that EPA and states may not waive review of
uncontaminated cooling water discharges exceeding a daily aver-
age of 500 million gallons per day. Id. § 123.24(b)(5).
C. NUFFF WILL ARGUE THAT FLOW, INTAKE WATER, AND NON-
CONTACT COOLING WATER ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
CWA
NUFFF argues that flow, intake water, and non-contact cool-
ing water are all within the scope of the CWA because they are in
effect different measures of the same parameter. Intake and non-
contact cooling water, NUFFF contends, are different ways of ex-
pressing the flow limitations imposed in the permits: both intake
water and non-contact cooling water are limiting the proportional
flow of the river. The Supreme Court found flow to be an appro-
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priate state-imposed limitation under section 401 to achieve water
quality standards to protect fish propagation. PUD No. 1, 511
U.S. 700, 722. Citizens have been able to enforce water quality
standards incorporated in permits since permits must comply
with section 301, which incorporates by reference section 303 re-
quirements for water quality standards. Northwest Envtl. Advo-
cates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 1995) , cert.
denied, 518 U.S 1018 (1996) (citing PUD No. 1 for the proposition
that section 303 is incorporated by reference in section 301; there-
fore, compliance with section 402 permitting process includes com-
pliance with section 303 requirements). These limitations taken
together are protecting the flow necessary to achieve water qual-
ity standards; therefore, the conditions are valid and within the
CWA's scope.
NUFFF will point to regulations underlying section 316(b) in
support of its positions. Section 316(b) requires the regulation of
an intake structure's capacity in order to minimize adverse envi-
ronmental effects. In this case, New Union has imposed a limit on
the amount of water NUPEC may withdraw, in effect limiting the
structure's capacity to withdraw and hold more water. This is
consistent with the EPA's justification for proportional flow limits
because "[slizable proportional withdrawals from a stream or river
might also change the physical character of the affected reach of
the river and availability of suitable habitat, potentially affecting
the environmental or ecological value to the aquatic organisms."
66 Fed. Reg. at 65,277. This is precisely New Union's goal: to pro-
tect fish propagation by preserving a minimum quantity of water
in the river necessary to maintain suitable habitat. The intake
parameter ensures no more than the permitted amount is with-
drawn; the discharge parameter ensures the return of no more
than the permitted amount; and the flow parameter ensures the
maintenance of the necessary volume of water.
D. NUPEC WILL ARGUE THAT FLOW, INTAKE WATER, AND NON-
CONTACT COOLING WATER EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE CWA
NUPEC avers that all three parameters exceed the CWA's
scope. NUPEC points out that EPA does not include intake limi-
tations in permits unless required to do so by a state's certifica-
tion. See Exhibit 2 ("EPA's regulations and guidelines do not call
for a limitation on water intake, for the CWA regulates discharges,
not intakes."). NUPEC contends that the reason why EPA does
not limit intake water lies in section 101(g) of the Act, preserving
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the right of states to allocate water. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
Since this permit's intake limit is a limitation on the quantity of
water to be withdrawn, as opposed to the quality of the water dis-
charged, this parameter goes beyond the scope of the Act. The
summer flow parameters also exceed the scope because they too
limit quantities of water withdrawn rather than quality.
NUPEC will also argue section 316(b) intake regulations are
intended to prevent entrainment and impingement rather than to
maintain the river's water flow, quantity, or volume. The regula-
tions reduce capacity so that less water is withdrawn, thereby lim-
iting the number of entrained fish and fish eggs. 66 Fed. Reg. at
65,277-278; see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(b)(1). The velocity of the
withdrawal is reduced to minimize the number of aquatic orga-
nisms affected. 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,278; see also 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.84(b)(2). Other design and construction technologies involve
the use of intake screen systems, diversion and avoidance sys-
tems, passive intake systems, and fish handling systems all aimed
at reducing entrainment and impingement. 66 Fed. Reg. at
65,279; see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(b)(4). Proportional flow limits
for rivers are limited to five percent of the river's mean annual
flow based on the estimations limiting the percentage of entrain-
ment to five percent of organisms living in the water. 66 Fed. Reg.
at 65,277; see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(b)(3)(i). The intake regula-
tions simply do not regulate a water source's volume. There are
no other regulations requiring the maintenance of minimum
water volumes, unlike the flow limit in this permit, which ensures
a consistent volume of water in the river. Thus, the flow parame-
ter exceeds the Act's scope.
NUPEC argues non-contact cooling water exceeds the scope
because it too is in the permit only because of the state's certifica-
tion. EPA regulates the source water flow used by a facility. See
40 C.F.R. § 122.45(b) (explaining that facilities must make projec-
tions of discharges based on capacity or operation). NUPEC ex-
plains that the flow limit indirectly limits the amount of the
discharge, i.e., a facility cannot discharge more water than it with-
drew in the first place. Thus, the only reason the cooling water
limit is in the permit is due to the state's certification, and that
limit exceeds the CWA's scope.
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E. EPA WILL ARGUE THAT INTAKE LIMITATIONS EXCEED THE
SCOPE OF THE ACT, SUMMER FLOWS ARE MORE STRINGENT,
AND THE COOLING WATER DISCHARGE LIMITS ARE
DUPLICATIVE
There is no question that EPA regulations include flow. The
regulations outlined above discuss flow in the context of discharge
parameter estimates in applications, measured and enforced in
permits, and protected when designing new intake structures to
withdraw cooling water. The EPA will argue that the summer
flow limits in these permits are the type of more stringent stan-
dards states are authorized to impose under the Act to protect
water quality standards. As set out in Issue I, the Act expressly
reserves the rights of states to impose more stringent standards.
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1370(1)(B). EPA must approve
state water quality standards and promulgate new standards
where a state establishes standards that are inconsistent with the
Act. Id. § 1313(a)(3)(C). EPA regulations expressly recognize that
states may include standards regarding low flow when establish-
ing water quality standards. 40 C.F.R. § 131.13. In this instance,
New Union imposed a flow of four million gallons a day (mgd),
reduced to three mgd during summer months, in order to achieve
water quality standards necessary to protect fish propagation in
the New Union River. This low flow standard in exactly the kind
of more stringent standard states may impose under the CWA.
The EPA agrees that proportional flow limitations do ensure
the availability of suitable fish habitat, as it stated in publishing
new intake structure regulations. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,277. Al-
though the CWA generally regulates discharges, section 316(b)
regulates water withdrawal to the degree it affects the goal of re-
storing the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
water, including marine life protection and propagation. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1326(b). The intake regulations were ulti-
mately intended to protect and facilitate fish propagation by mini-
mizing the occurrence of entrainment and impingement of fish
and fish eggs resulting from water withdrawal. The elements of
location, design, construction, and capacity are geared towards
minimizing this adverse environmental impact, as required by the
Act, as is the proportional flow requirement. No estimates were
included in the rules based on the volume of water necessary to
sustain appropriate fish habitat.
NUDNR designed the intake parameter in NUPEC's permit
to maintain the volume of water remaining in the river by limiting
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the amount withdrawn. The Act does not regulate intake for
maintaining minimum volume; therefore, it exceeds the scope. As
EPA explains in the NUDNR permit fact sheet, intake and dis-
charge volumes are usually equal to each other making it unnec-
essary to impose a separate limitation on intake water. See
Exhibit 2.
EPA will argue that the non-contact cooling water limitation
is duplicative of the flow limitation. The imposition of this stan-
dard in a permit exceeds the Act's scope, although the standard
itself, already achieved via the flow limitation, is within the scope
of the Act. EPA explains that non-contact cooling water dis-
charges do not have to be limited to protect fish propagation be-
cause "the flow limitation already limits the volume of water that
may be used and discharged," and if the intake water included
pollutants requiring treatment, those conditions would be in-
cluded in the permit. See Fact Sheet, Exhibit 2.
EPA will argue it is charged with implementing the CWA, and
this Court must therefore defer to EPA's interpretation and the
regulations it promulgated to achieve the Act's objectives. When
reviewing an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers,
a court must first determine "whether Congress has spoken to the
precise question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842. However,
"if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
Through the CWA, Congress charged EPA with the authority to
issue "rules carrying the force of law," and EPA is now claiming
deference for rules "promulgated in the exercise of that authority."
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). The Act
charges the administrator of the EPA with administering the Act.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). In terms of water quality standards, the Ad-
ministrator is expressly charged with approving state water qual-
ity standards and implementing standards where the state has
either failed to do so or fails to establish standards sufficient to
achieve the purpose of the Act. Id. §§ 1313(a)(3)(C), (b). Thus, on
the face of the statute, Congress delegated to EPA the authority to
issue rules with the "force of law." See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32.
The CWA's central tenet is that it is illegal to discharge a pol-
lutant into navigable waters without a permit. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a). The intake of water is the exact opposite of a discharge.
However, the Act also expressly authorized the imposition of any
other conditions in permits to achieve water quality standards.
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Id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1342(a). EPA will counter that it achieves
this statutory objective without regulating the intake amount be-
cause any pollutants in intake water are accounted for upon dis-
charge from the facility, and water quality standards reliant on
the amount of water in the source water are protected through
flow limitations.
EPA will also point to CWA section 304(f)(2)(F) to demon-
strate that the statute itself unambiguously contemplates the reg-
ulation of flow, not intake, to control pollution. See id.
§ 1314(f)(2)(F). The flow regulations and the regulation of intake
pollutants adequately address any threat posed by the discharge
of non-contact cooling water. While the Act does not explicitly
speak to the issue of spent cooling water as a measure of "pollu-
tion" or a "pollutant," EPA's regulations at 40 C.F.R. sections 122
on permit conditions, 123 on approval of state programs, and 131
on water quality standards account for the discharge of spent cool-
ing water. These regulations fill in the interstices of the Act based
on a permissible construction of the statute, are consistent with
the statute's purpose, and are reasonable in substance. See Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 844.
F. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT FLOW IS WITHIN THE ACT'S
SCOPE THE LIMITS ON INTAKE WATER EXCEED THE ACT'S
SCOPE, AND NON-COOLING WATER DISCHARGE LIMITS ARE
REDUNDANT
The Supreme Court's analysis in PUD No. 1 is extremely
helpful in this situation since the situations are very similar. In
PUD No. 1, the Court addressed the issue of whether minimum
seasonal stream flows to protect fish habitats were appropriate
conditions for a state to impose in a permit through section 401.
511 U.S. at 703. As in this case, the state of Washington certified
a federal license for a hydroelectric facility, including in the per-
mit a condition limiting seasonal minimum stream flow necessary
to preserve the Dosewallips River's designated use as spawning
waters for steelhead and salmon. Id. at 706. The Court reasoned
that the river's designated use, as protected fish habitat, was con-
sistent with the CWA's goal of "maintaining the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 511 U.S. at
714 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
The Court noted "the Act defines pollution as 'the man-made
or man induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological,
and radiological integrity of water."' 511 U.S. at 714 (quoting 33
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U.S.C. § 1362(19)). The proposed hydroelectricity project would
cause pollution because it would interfere with the water's flow, or
physical integrity. Flow, as a permit condition, was the kind of
condition contemplated by the Act necessary under section
301(b)(1)(C) to counter the effect of this type of pollution and
achieve water quality standards, including the propagation of fish,
under section 303. 511 U.S. at 714; see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) (requiring implementation of "any more stringent
limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality
standards. .. ").
The Court also addressed the quality versus quantity argu-
ment that NUPEC seeks to raise in this case. First, the Court
observed that water quality and quantity are interrelated: lower
water quantity could diminish or destroy a water body's desig-
nated use, resulting in diminished water quality. 511 U.S. at 719.
The Court then pointed again to section 502(19)'s definition of
"pollution," concluding, "the Clean Water Act itself [recognizes]
that reduced stream flow, i.e. [,1 diminishment of water quality,
can constitute water pollution." Id. The Court also considered
section 304(f)(2)(F)'s recognition that changes in water flow can
cause water pollution. Id. at 719-20. Finally, the Court consid-
ered sections 101(g) and 510(2), reserving state rights over water
allocation. Dismissing the application of these sections to the
facts, the Court concluded that these sections "do not limit the
scope of water pollution controls that may be imposed on users
who have obtained, pursuant to state law, a water allocation." Id.
at 720.
In this case, New Union has imposed on NUPEC a flow condi-
tion necessary to promote fish propagation. The flow condition in
NUPEC's permit is similar to the flow condition at issue in PUD
No. 1 because both permits are based on water quality standards.
Point sources must meet water quality standards pursuant to sec-
tion 301(b)(1)(C). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). The CWA expressly
recognizes the effect changes in flow may have on designated uses,
and the statute goes so far as to term these changes "pollution."
See id. § 1314(f)(2)(F). Therefore, the flow condition cannot be
more stringent than the Act, nor is it beyond the scope, because it
is a necessary limitation imposed to achieve water quality stan-
dards. New Union's flow conditions are well within the Act's
scope.
Like the defendant in PUD No. 1, NUPEC tries to argue that
New Union imposed the flow condition under its expressly re-
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served authority to regulate and allocate water quantities. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251(g), 1370. Under these circumstances, the flow con-
dition exceeds the scope of the Act, which does not allocate water
quantities, and NUFFF would not be able to enforce this condition
under the citizen suit provisions. However, there are no facts in
this case to suggest New Union was allocating water quantities.
Even if New Union was concerned in part with quantity, as the
Supreme Court observed, the Act's reservation of states rights to
allocate water does not limit states' abilities to impose pollution
controls on those who have obtained an allocation. See PUD No. 1,
511 U.S. at 720.
NUPEC's permit condition limiting the amount of water the
facilities withdraw exceeds the CWA's scope for two reasons: the
CWA generally regulates discharges, but where intake structures
are concerned, it also regulates locations, design, construction,
and capacity of the structure to minimize entrainment and im-
pingement. See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b); see also 40 C.F.R.
§§ 122.45(g), 125.84(b). The practical effect of the intake limita-
tion in this instance is to duplicate the limitation on flow. This
condition is not regulating the intake structure location, design, or
construction. Nor is it regulating the intake structure's capacity:
capacity within the meaning of the Act refers to the amount of
water the structure uses to cool a facility. By reducing the capac-
ity, the intake structure improves its efficiency because it is using
less water. Any attempt to regulate water intake for any reason
other than to prevent pollution and protect water quality stan-
dards is clearly outside the scope of the Act. In this instance, the
intake parameter exceeds the scope of the Act because it is not
regulating the location, design, construction, or capacity of the in-
take structure. Even though the withdrawal of water may affect
the water quality, the permit already regulates flow for the same
purpose of preserving a minimum river volume. The intake pa-
rameter in this permit exceeds the Act's scope.
The condition limiting the amount of spent cooling water dis-
charged also duplicates the flow condition. The permit limits the
intake, the flow, and the spent cooling water discharge to four
mgd during the cooler months and three mgd during the summer
months of June through September. As a practical matter, the
facility cannot discharge more water than it withdraws, and the
amount of water it takes in for cooling will be roughly the amount
of water that it discharges as spent cooling water. The limitations
of both intake and spent cooling water are satisfied by the flow
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condition which represents the maximum amount of water that
can seasonally be withdrawn and discharged to maintain water
quality standards to support fish propagation. The only distinc-
tion between the intake limitation and the spent cooling water
limitation, although each achieves the same purpose as the flow
limitation, is that the intake parameter limits the amount of
water taken into the facility while the spent cooling water param-
eter limits the amount of water discharged from the facility.
Spent non-contact cooling water limitations are not outside the
scope of the Act because they regulate discharges. However, in
this instance they are serving the same purpose as flow limita-
tions, to regulate the discharge; thus, they are duplicative.
Both NUFFF and NUPEC presented arguments concerning
whether water was a pollutant and whether water, as such, could
constitute a discharge of a pollutant when the system expels it
back into the river from which it came. However, neither of these
arguments is relevant to the issues in this case. The analysis of
the statute, the regulations, and the legislative history has
demonstrated that the regulation of flow is necessary to combat
pollution and protect the integrity of the Nation's waters. Implicit
in this is the recognition that water, which constitutes flow, must
be discharged either into the water body from which it is with-
drawn or into another water body, and this is a regulated event
consistent with the Act's goals.
III. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING
THAT WHEN A STATE ASSESSES PENALTIES
FOR SOME VIOLATIONS OF A PERMIT
UNDER A STATE AUTHORITY
COMPARABLE TO CWA § 309(G), CITIZENS ARE
BARRED FROM SEEKING PENALTIES FOR
OTHER VIOLATIONS AND ARE BARRED FROM
SEEKING AN INJUNCTION AGAINST FUTURE
VIOLATIONS?
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE ENFORCEMENT PRECLUSION PROVISION
1. The Statute
Violators of the CWA are subject to enforcement actions for
civil penalties. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). In the context of state en-
forcement actions, section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) bars the Administrator
from enforcing the Act when the state has either begun prosecu-
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tion of the violation under "state law comparable to this subsec-
tion," or if the state has issued a final order and the violator has
paid a penalty assessed under "state law comparable to this sub-
section." Id. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). This limitation on civil penalty
actions is extended to citizen suits except when the citizen suit is
filed prior to commencement of the state action or where notice of
intent to sue under section 505 has been given before any state
action has commenced, and the citizen suit action is filed within
120 days after notice is given. Id. § 1319(g)(6)(B).
2. The Legislative History
Congress amended the CWA in 1987 to add to the EPA's en-
forcement arsenal the ability to assess administrative civil penal-
ties as an additional enforcement mechanism to address obvious
violations that were not so serious as to require judicial enforce-
ment. Congress intended the new authority to "address past,
rather than continuing, violations .... Continuing violations are
more appropriately addressed by abatement orders or injunctive
actions," and the limitations in section 309(g)(6) were "intended to
assure that violations of greater magnitude are handled judicially
and are pursued in a judicial forum." S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 26
(1985).
Congress was also concerned with preventing duplicative en-
forcement of violations, but sought to bar such actions "only where
a State is proceeding under a State law that is comparable to sec-
tion 309(g)." 133 Cong. Rec. S. 733 (Jan. 14, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Chafee). State laws would be considered comparable to sec-
tion 309(g) so long as they included similar provisions for public
notice and participation procedures, "analogous penalty assess-
ment factors and judicial review standards," and other provisions
similar to those included in the section. Id.
The two houses debated exactly what kinds of subsequent or
additional actions are barred. Ultimately, the language of section
309(g)(6) embodied the compromise. Thus, the limitations do not
apply to citizen suits filed prior to the state action, citizen suits
commenced within 120 days of notice, or "to an action seeking re-
lief other than civil penalties (e.g., an injunction or declaratory
judgment).... ." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1004, at 133 (1986) (em-
phasis added). This bar "allows citizens to go to court in the case
of continuing violations which . . . is a fair compromise." 131
Cong. Rec. H5993 (July 22, 1985) (statement of Rep. Edgar). The
Senate Report finalized these intentions, precluding subsequent
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enforcement actions "only . . . for the same violations which are
the subject of the administrative civil penalties proceedings." S.
Rep. No. 99-50, at 28.
B. How THE COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED THE SECTION 309(G)(6)
BAR
In North and South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scitu-
ate, the First Circuit concluded that the section 309(g)(6) bar acts
to preclude any citizen suits against violators who are the subject
of a state enforcement action diligently prosecuted under compa-
rable state law. 949 F.2d 552, 555 (1st Cir. 1992). The Town of
Scituate was subject to a state administrative order requiring it to
upgrade its sewage treatment plant. Id. at 553-54. The state
chose not to assess penalties, reserving in the order the right to do
so at a later date. Id. at 554. A citizens' group filed a lawsuit
under section 505 seeking civil penalties, declaratory, and injunc-
tive relief against the town's ongoing CWA violations. Id. at 554-
55. The court rejected the argument that the bar only applied to
civil penalty actions. Id. at 555. The court first noted that it af-
forded deference to the administrative agency's enforcement deci-
sion. Id. at 556-57. The court then explained that both Congress
and the Supreme Court recognize a state's administrative order
bars citizens from seeking any relief because (1) the CWA gives
states primary enforcement authority, (2) citizen suits are de-
signed to supplement the state's primary enforcement authority,
and (3) citizen suits are appropriate only where the state has
failed to act. Id. at 558. To allow citizens to commence a suit for
any kind of relief against the same violations the state chose not
to prosecute would ignore the state's primary enforcement author-
ity and discretion. Id.
Rejecting arguments that the literal language of section
309(g)(6), which refers only to civil penalty actions, was of any im-
port, the court determined that this would lead to an "absurd re-
sult" because this would mean that courts deferred to government
enforcement actions only when civil penalty actions commenced.
949 F.2d at 558. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
which explained in dicta that the citizen suit provision was a sup-
plemental enforcement provision available only when federal or
state agencies failed to act. 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987). In
Gwaltney, the Court concluded that allowing citizens to seek civil
penalties for past violations the state chose not to prosecute in ex-
402 [Vol. 21
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol21/iss2/6
BENCH MEMORANDUM
change for the violator's undertaking of corrective measures
would permit an unacceptable intrusion into a state's enforcement
authority. Id. at 61. The First Circuit believed that Scituate
presented the same policy issues presented by the facts in
Gwaltney. Allowing citizens to seek declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against violations the state sought to leverage in an adminis-
trative order impermissibly intruded on the state's valid exercise
of its enforcement discretion. 949 F.2d at 558.
Other courts have followed Scituate, liberally construing sec-
tion 309(g)(6) to promote the policy that it is appropriate to defer
to a state's enforcement decisions under the Act. Thus, the bar
acts to preclude all citizen suits, including those seeking only de-
claratory and injunctive relief, so long as the state has made some
enforcement decision. Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29
F.3d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that to permit citizen suits
for declaratory and injunctive relief against violations the state
has subjected to its own administrative enforcement action would
be unnecessarily duplicative and result in undue interference);
Jarrett v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd., No. 00-A-527-N,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 522, *17 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (agreeing with
Scituate's interpretation of section 309(g)(6) bar); Conn. Coastal
Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 173,
181 (D. Conn. 1991) (rejecting interpretation of section 309(g)(6)
barring citizen suits only when state has assessed civil penalties),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1993). See
also N.Y. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanita-
tion, 772 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding citizen suits
seeking penalties are barred when there is a pending consent or-
der in which state has chosen to forgo penalties, and to find other-
wise would unnecessarily undermine state enforcement
decisions). Cf Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc.,
892 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (D.N.M. 1995) (describing the policy con-
cerns of courts seeking to prevent citizen suits from interfering
with state enforcement actions as well-founded, but finding that
the literal language precludes barring citizen suits for declaratory
and injunctive relief).
There are courts that have rejected this interpretation of sec-
tion 309(g)(6) in favor of the statute's plain language. The Ninth
Circuit found that the literal meaning of section 309(g)(6) bars cit-
izen suits only when the state has actually exercised its enforce-
ment authority through the imposition of civil penalties. Citizens
for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co. of Cal. (UNOCAL), 83 F.3d
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1111, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 1996). In UNOCAL, California entered
into a settlement agreement with UNOCAL requiring payment of
a sum of money and implementation of removal technologies in
exchange for an extended deadline on selenium discharge limita-
tions. Id. at 1114. The Citizens sued for violations of the CWA.
Id. at 1115. The court rejected the notion that the settlement
money was a penalty, instead finding it to be a payment releasing
UNOCAL from legal liability. Id. at 1116. This was not a penalty
assessed as contemplated by section 309(g)(6); rather it was akin
to an administrative compliance order. Id. at 1116-17.
The court cited an earlier Ninth Circuit decision holding that,
based on the plain language of the statute, section 309(g)(6)
barred citizen suits only when the state was diligently prosecuting
an administrative civil penalty action. Id. at 1117 (citing Wash.
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d
883, 885 (9th Cir. 1993)). Since California entered into an admin-
istrative compliance order with UNOCAL, as opposed to prosecut-
ing a civil penalty action against it, there was no state
administrative civil penalty proceeding barring the citizen suit.
Id. at 1117-18. Following Pendleton Woolen Mills' rejection of
Scituate, the court dismissed the notion that it should ignore the
legislative history and the plain language of the statute in favor of
concern for preserving state enforcement discretion. Id.
Other courts have followed UNOCAL's plain reading analysis
to find that section 309(g) bars citizen suits only when the state is
diligently prosecuting an administrative civil penalty action. In
Coalition for a Livable West Side, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of
Environmental Protection, the court found the language of section
309(g) to be "clear and unambiguous" in applying the bar to civil
penalty actions only. 830 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Many other courts have been persuaded by this logic. See Atl.
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235, 248
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the plain language of § 309(g)(6)
bars citizen suits seeking civil penalties but not claims for injunc-
tive or declaratory relief); Sierra Club v. Hyundai Am. Inc., 23 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (D. Or. 1997) (stating, "It would require a
significant departure from the plain meaning of the statute to find
plaintiffs' case for injunctive or declaratory relief [is] barred by
[section 309(g)(6)]."); Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. City of W.
Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792, 806 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding sec-
tion 309(g)(6) is "unambiguous that only civil penalty actions are
barred"); Orange Env't, Inc. v. City of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003,
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1017-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting section 309(g)(6) "precludes only
citizen suits seeking civil penalties.").
C. NUFFF WILL ARGUE THAT SECTION 309(G)(6) DOES NOT BAR
CITIZEN SUITS SEEKING INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF
OR CIVIL PENALTY ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS NOT SUBJECT
TO ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY ACTION
NUFFF will argue that section 309(g)(6) bars only citizen
suits seeking to impose civil penalties for violations already sub-
ject to an administrative civil penalty action under comparable
state law. New Union did not assess civil penalties against the
summer months' violations, so there is no state action that can
serve to bar a citizen suit to enforce against those violations. The
statutory language bars citizen suits from enforcing against viola-
tions for which penalties were paid. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii);
see also UNOCAL, discussed supra. The use of the past tense
must mean that the Act does not bar citizens and the Administra-
tor from enforcing other violations. The legislative history bol-
sters this interpretation, stating that the Act precluded
subsequent enforcement actions "only . . . for the same violations
which are the subject of the administrative civil penalty proceed-
ings." S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 28. Barring a citizen suit to impose
penalties on unpunished violations defeats the purpose of citizen
suits to supplement state action where it fails to enforce the law.
Following UNOCAL, NUFFF will argue that the plain lan-
guage of the statute imposes a bar against civil penalties only.
The legislative history supports this reading of the statute. The
legislative history explicitly refers to injunctions as the type of ac-
tions that are not barred when a federal or state agency has com-
menced an administrative civil penalty action under § 309(g) or
comparable state law. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1004, at 133
(1986). Therefore, NUFFF is legally entitled to bring a citizen suit
seeking an injunction against NUPEC to prevent future permit
violations.
D. NUPEC WILL ARGUE THAT THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER TO
NEW UNION'S ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS
NUPEC will argue that Scituate and Gwaltney apply to this
case. The CWA expressly recognizes the states as the primary en-
forcement authority of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) ("It is the
policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the pri-
mary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
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eliminate pollution .... "). As the Supreme Court's analysis of the
legislative history demonstrates, section 309(g)(6)'s bar on citizen
suits when the state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting
a violation "reinforces" Congress's view of citizen suits as "meant
to supplement rather than to supplant governmental action."
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). To find otherwise would
"change the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to poten-
tially intrusive." Id. at 61.
The Scituate court correctly recognized that this statutory ex-
pression of a state's role as primary enforcer means courts must
defer to state enforcement decisions. To find otherwise would lead
to a contradictory result that must be avoided. "Where literal in-
terpretation of a statue [sic] would lead to an absurd result, the
Court must strive to provide an alternative meaning that avoids
the irrational consequence." Scituate, 949 F.2d at 558 (citing
Green v. Block Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring)). Here, the Court should seek to avoid two
absurd results. First, it is nonsensical to bar only citizen suits
seeking penalties where a state has already done so and yet allow
citizen suits for injunctive or declaratory relief regardless of the
state's enforcement action.
Second, the Act preserves the states' primary enforcement
role, and to allow citizens to interfere with state enforcement deci-
sions would contravene the federalist policy embodied in the act.
A "hyper-technical" reading of section 309(g) interferes with Con-
gress' prevailing policy that states are the primary enforcers. This
Court must avoid any statutory interpretation that interferes
with this policy. Congress expressly incorporated a policy of feder-
alism into the Act. In this case, New Union faced power shortages
during the summer months, and it chose not to enforce against
violations during that time. It assessed appropriate penalties for
permit violations while balancing its environmental needs with its
energy producing needs. Congress' federalist principles embodied
in the Act were intended to preserve for the states the authority to
make these local policy decisions.
E. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT SECTION 309(G)(6) DOES NOT
BAR CITIZEN SUITS SEEKING DECLARATORY OR INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF OR THE ENFORCEMENT OF VIOLATIONS NOT
SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL PENALTIES
The canons of statutory interpretation compel this Court to
conclude that section 309(g)(6) does not bar citizen suits seeking
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declaratory or injunctive relief when administrative civil penalty
actions are proceeding, nor does it bar citizen suit enforcement of
violations that have not been the subject of a diligently prosecuted
civil penalty action under comparable state law. Beginning with
the plain language of the statute, section 309(g)(6) prevents the
Administrator from commencing an enforcement action against:
[A]ny violation.., with respect to which a State has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State law compa-
rable to this subsection, or... for which... the State has issued
a final order not subject to further judicial review and the viola-
tor has paid a penalty assessed under this subsection, or such
comparable State law....
33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), (iii). These limitations are extended
to citizen suits under section 505, except where the citizen suit
was filed before the state action or where the citizen suit is com-
menced within 120 days after giving notice. Id. § 1319(g)(6)(B).
The expression of one thing in a statute suggests the exclu-
sion of others. See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 895 (1989);
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978). The preclu-
sion provisions are located in section 309(g), entitled "Administra-
tive penalties." The specific language of this subsection refers
only to civil penalty actions. The section mentions no other type of
relief, and civil penalties are one of three possible remedies citi-
zens can pursue under section 505(a)(1). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)
(permitting citizens to seek injunctions, declaratory orders, or civil
penalties under section 309(d)). The subsection also refers to civil
penalties assessed under "this subsection, or such comparable
State law. . . ." Id. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii). Although this language is
not identical to language barring a state's diligent prosecution
under "state law comparable to this subsection," the obvious
meaning is, in both instances, that states must be prosecuting
civil penalty actions under state law comparable to section 309(g)
in order to bar enforcement actions brought by either the EPA or
citizens.
The legislative history, discussed supra, supports this statu-
tory interpretation, and the majority of the courts agree. Section
309(g)(6) does not bar citizens from seeking injunctions against
violators who are subject to or have paid penalties as a result of
state enforcement actions. Additionally, section 309(g)(6)'s focus
on any violations subject to such civil penalty actions demon-
strates that any violations not subject to civil penalty actions are
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fair game. The use of the past tense in section 309(g)(6)(A)(iii) bol-
sters this position, referring to penalties paid. Indeed, the Senate
Report explicitly states that the section 309(g)(6) bar precludes
EPA or citizen enforcement actions "only ... for the same viola-
tions which are the subject of the administrative civil penalties
proceeding." S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 28 (1987).
The record from the court below does not indicate whether
New Union enforced against the permit violations under compara-
ble state law. There is no discussion about New Union's laws used
to bring the enforcement action against NUPEC. Penalties of
$1000 per month of violations may seem paltry when the statute
provides for penalties of up to $25,000 for Class I violations and
$125,000 for Class II violations. However, NUFF has not chal-
lenged the comparability of New Unions laws, and NUPEC only
urges this Court to avoid a hyper-technical reading of section
309(g) that would interfere with New Union's enforcement
discretion.
NUPEC's argument that NUFFF must be barred from seek-
ing injunctive relief because it conflicts with the federalist goals of
the Act is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court has instructed
courts not to defer to governments' enforcement discretion when
Congress chooses to restrict it under a federal statute. Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985). Under the CWA, Congress
created a federal scheme to prevent water pollution and imple-
mented enforcement provisions to achieve that end. States are
delegated authority to enforce the Act under comparable state
law. Likewise, citizens are delegated enforcement authority
under specific circumstances, such as when there is no prosecu-
tion of permit violations or abatement of ongoing violations.
The Scituate decision on which NUPEC relies is flawed, and it
runs counter to the reasoning applied by a majority of courts that
have grappled with section 309(g)(6). Scituate ignores the plain
language of the statute, and it does not analyze the legislative his-
tory. Instead, it relies on dicta from a Supreme Court case refer-
ring to legislative history from 1972 concerning citizen suits to
interpret a 1987 amendment to the Act, concerning enforcement
provisions. In Gwaltney, the Court determined that Congress in-
tended citizen suits to supplement rather than supplant state en-
forcement actions. 484 U.S. at 60. This conclusion arose from its
reading of the Senate Report referring to section 505, which ex-
plained that states were anticipated to represent "the great vol-
ume of enforcement actions" and citizens could step in where
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federal and state agencies failed to act. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No.
92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746).
The Court then mused that Congress would not have intended cit-
izens to interfere with states' enforcement decisions to forgo civil
penalties and pursue other administrative remedies instead. Id.
at 61. Scituate then expanded this to mean state enforcement de-
cisions required deferential treatment, and the section 309(g)(6)
bar must preclude all citizen suits against violators already sub-
ject to some state administrative proceeding because to find other-
wise would interfere with this deference.
The Scituate decision ignores the effect of its interpretation.
Congress amended the Act in 1987 to give EPA stronger enforce-
ment authority and an alternative to going to court for less serious
violations. At the same time, Congress wanted to prevent duplica-
tive enforcement actions in which a violator was faced with an ac-
tion from the state and the administrator, each seeking penalties
for the same violations. See Jeffrey Miller, Themes and Variations
in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Enforcement Actions
by EPA and Citizens in Environmental Statutes, at 14-17, 22
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). At the
same time, Congress did not want states to insulate polluters from
enforcement actions. Id. It would be all too tempting for a state to
negotiate a deal with polluters whereby the state commences an
enforcement action or administrative order protecting polluters
from much larger penalties in exchange for jobs, taxes, community
investment, or kickbacks. Finding section 309(g)(6) to bar all sub-
sequent citizen actions must logically mean that EPA is also
barred, and this undermines Congress' intent to give EPA this en-
hanced enforcement authority in the first place. Such a result
simply does not make sense.
In the instant case, NUFFF seeks an injunction against
NUPEC to prevent further permit violations. NUFFF also seeks
civil penalties for violations of permit conditions during the sum-
mer months, which were not subject to New Union's enforcement
action. This Court should find that NUFFF is not barred from
seeking injunctive relief from further permit violations. This
Court should also find that NUFFF is not barred from enforcing
any violations not subject to New Union's administrative civil pen-
alty action.
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IV. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING
THAT WHEN A SINGLE ACT OMISSION
VIOLATES SEVERAL CONDITIONS IN A
CWA PERMIT THERE IS A SINGLE
VIOLATION OF THE PERMIT?
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Section 309(d) subjects violators of the CWA to civil penalties
"not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d) (emphasis added). Citizens can seek the appropriate
civil penalties under this section. See id. § 1354(a). The current
statutory language differs from the original language of section
309(d), which imposed a penalty "per day of such violation." See
100 Cong. Rec. 983 (1987) (emphasis added). The amendment
changing "of such" to "for each" was intended to "clarify that each
distinct violation is subject to a separate daily penalty assess-
ment. . . ." S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 25 (1985). Section 309(d) distin-
guishes the penalty treatment for a single operational upset that
causes violations of several permit conditions. In that situation,
"simultaneous violations of more than one pollutant parameter
shall be treated as a single violation." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). This
exception, by identifying a particular situation in which multiple
violations are treated as a single violation for penalty assessment
purposes, implies that other acts or omissions leading to multiple
violations will be subject to penalties for each parameter exceeded.
This is consistent with the canon of statutory interpretation that
the inclusion of one means the exclusion of others. Thus, the stat-
utory construction indicates that each violation of a permit condi-
tion, not each violating act, is subject to civil penalties, unless
those violations result from a single operational upset.
B. THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION309(D)
Prior to section 309(d)'s amendment, the last court to deal
with the old language "of such violation" construed it to mean that
the maximum penalty amount was assessed on the basis of how
many days the permit was violated, regardless of how many condi-
tions were violated on any given day. Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1555 (E.D. Va.
1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). In Gwaltney, the permittee vio-
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lated several pollutant parameters each day. The court found the
statute ambiguous on whether penalties were leveled against each
violation of an effluent limit per day or for each day on which vio-
lations occurred. Id. The court found nothing helpful in the legis-
lative history and rejected another district court's amenability to
such an interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1554; see United
States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 n.1 (W.D. Mo.
1984).
Subsequent to the amendment, most courts have applied pen-
alties consistently with Congress' intent that each violation occur-
ring on a given day is subject to penalties, unless a single
operational upset has caused the violations. In United States v.
Smithfield Foods, a single daily wastewater discharge violated
multiple pollutant parameters contained in Smithfield's permit,
including the daily average, monthly concentration, and monthly
loading discharge limits for several pollutants. 191 F.3d 516 (4th
Cir. 1999). Affirming the district court decision, the circuit court
held, "I1f multiple violations of the Permit occur on the same day,
defendants are liable for a separate day for each violation of the
Permit, including the daily maximum, monthly average concen-
tration, and monthly average loading limits for each pollutant."
Id. at 527 (quoting 972 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D. Va. 1997)). The
circuit court agreed with the district court that the language of
section 309(d) compels the result of penalizing each violation, not
the underlying act that causes the violations. 191 F.3d at 527.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that daily and
monthly limits of the same pollutants constituted double counting.
It noted that daily averages were twice as high as monthly aver-
ages, so a violation of one did not automatically constitute a viola-
tion of the other. 191 F.3d at 527. The court also cited policy
reasons in support of the conclusion that this did not represent
double counting, finding that this scheme provided courts with
flexibility in setting penalties commensurate with the level of cul-
pability. Id. Additionally, the court noted that to hold otherwise
would mean that permittees could violate as many permit condi-
tions as they wanted on a single day and never face stiffer penal-
ties; this was contrary to the deterrent purpose of section 309(g).
Id. at 527-28. Once a permittee violated one daily limit, there
would be no incentive to comply with the rest of the limits for that
day. Id. at 528.
The Smithfield holding is consistent with several decisions
considering how to calculate daily penalties against multiple vio-
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lations resulting from a single act or omission. Natural Res. Def
Council v. Texaco Ref & Mktg., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1, 20 (D. Del.
1992) (finding exceedances of mass loading limits and concentra-
tion limits for the same parameter constitute two separate viola-
tions because each limit serves a specific regulatory function);
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc.,
913 F.2d 64, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding daily violations of the
mass and concentration limits for a single pollutant constituted
two separate violations and violating the seven-day average limit
and thirty-day average limit of a single pollutant also constituted
two separate violations); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Monsanto Co., No. 83-2040, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16702, at *32-
33 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 1988) (assessing separate penalties against
each time a single parameter's daily average discharge limit and
monthly daily maximum discharge limit was exceeded). Cf Atl.
States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1140
(11th Cir. 1990) (agreeing that multiple daily violations are sub-
ject to penalties, but declining to treat daily and monthly viola-
tions of the same parameter as separate violations: "[W]e find that
because discharge of a single pollutant may be the cause of both
daily and monthly violations, fining the violator twice may result
in imposing two fines for the same illegal act.").
C. NUFFF AND EPA ARGUE THAT A SINGLE ACT OR OMISSION
WHICH LEADS TO VIOLATIONS OF SEVERAL PERMIT
CONDITIONS ON A GIVEN DAY RESULTS IN PENALTIES
ASSESSED AGAINST EACH VIOLATION OF EACH PERMIT
CONDITION
NUFFF and EPA argue that permittees are subject to penal-
ties for each permit condition violated on a given day because of a
single act or omission, except where the single operational upset
exception applies. Thus, NUPEC is subject to penalties each day
for each discharge that exceeded the intake, flow, and cooling
water discharge limits. NUFFF and EPA will point to the statute,
the legislative history, and the majority of court decisions in sup-
port of this argument. These three elements do in fact support
NUFFF and EPA's position. This position contradicts NUFFF's
argument that intake, flow, and discharge limits are all within the
Act's scope because they all regulate flow, which is within that
scope; however, the interpretation of section 309(d) NUFFF
adopts in this argument is consistent with the statutory language.
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D. NUPEC ARGUES THAT A SINGLE ACT OR OMISSION WHICH
LEADS TO MULTIPLE PERMIT VIOLATIONS ON A GIVEN DAY
CONSTITUTES A SINGLE VIOLATION
NUPEC argues that a single act or omission, which leads to
multiple permit violations on a single day, constitutes a single vio-
lation for purposes of calculating penalties. Under this interpreta-
tion, NUPEC's single discharge exceeding the permitted intake,
flow, and cooling water discharge limitations constitutes one vio-
lation subject to penalties as opposed to three separate violations.
The plain language of the statute, referring to each violation per
day, does not support NUPEC's argument. The statute itself pro-
vides an exception to the rule that multiple violations resulting
from a single act or omission are subject to penalties. Single oper-
ational upsets that cause multiple violations are treated as a sin-
gle violation for penalty purposes. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). This
exception is not applicable here.
NUPEC relies on Gwaltney to support its argument. How-
ever, NUPEC's reliance on Gwaltney is misplaced for several rea-
sons. After the Gwaltney decision, Congress amended section
309(d) to clarify whether penalties should be assessed based on a
day of violations or multiple violations occurring on one day. Con-
gress intended the clarification to support the latter. Following
that amendment, the Fourth Circuit, the same court that affirmed
the Gwaltney decision, affirmed the district court in Smithfield
Foods in support of this clarification. The Fourth Circuit's appli-
cation of section 309(d) is consistent with the majority of courts
dealing with this issue.
NUPEC analogizes the Scituate court's analysis of section
309(g)(6)(A), preventing citizen suits when EPA or the state is dil-
igently prosecuting violations, to this case in which duplicative
penalties are allegedly being assessed. In Scituate, the court re-
jected an environmental group's citizen suit because it found the
state was diligently prosecuting CWA violations under comparable
state law when it decided not to assess penalties against a viola-
tor. 949 F.2d 552. Finding the state's statutory scheme to be com-
parable to the Act, the court reasoned that the state's decision to
forgo penalties in exchange for an administrative order compelling
the violator to upgrade its facility constituted diligent prosecution.
Id. at 556. In so doing, the court determined that allowing the
citizen suit to proceed would be duplicative enforcement of the
same violations. Id. "[E]xacting financial penalties in the name of
environmental protection at a time when remedial measures are
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well underway do not further [the Act's] goal." Id. This case is
similar, NUPEC avers, because assessing penalties against all
three violations, regardless of the fact that the violations were the
result of a single act, is a duplicative enforcement action for the
sake of exacting penalties only.
NUPEC also argues that violations of duplicative permit con-
ditions could not possibly constitute separate violations. NUPEC
avers intake, flow, and cooling water discharge conditions all limit
flow. NUPEC points to the Smithfield Foods decision, which dis-
tinguished between daily and monthly limits as intended to pro-
tect against separate, distinct effects stemming from the daily and
monthly discharges. 191 F.3d at 527. NUPEC contends that if
this Court accepts that section 309(d) penalizes each parameter
violated on a given day, the parameters must serve distinct pur-
poses to be enforceable. If Congress intended penalties to deter
dischargers from violating multiple permit violations on a given
day, the different parameters must serve distinct purposes, and
that distinction is rendered meaningless when it applies to two or
more parameters, which serve no distinct, separate purpose. To
hold otherwise would allow permit writers to arbitrarily treat
some dischargers more harshly than others by including duplica-
tive conditions in permits.
NUPEC will also argue that its due process right of funda-
mental fairness is violated by being penalized two or three times
for one alleged illegal act that resulted in permit violations. New
Union acted arbitrarily in imposing duplicative permit conditions
for which it can now collect multiple penalties. While NUPEC ac-
knowledges it cannot litigate this issue in this proceeding, it nev-
ertheless argues that this Court should consider this factor in its
decision. The Eleventh Circuit in Tyson Foods was reluctant to
penalize a discharger for violating the daily and monthly limits for
the same pollutant because that was tantamount to fining the vio-
lator twice for the same act. 897 F.2d at 1140. Likewise, in this
case, NUPEC faces fines for violating three conditions all regulat-
ing the volume of water in the river because of a single act. This is
a fundamentally unfair result, violating NUPEC's due process
rights. Since courts should avoid reaching an unconstitutional re-
sult when interpreting statutes, this Court should reject interpret-
ing section 309(b) to allow NUPEC to sustain multiple penalties
for a single act. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001)
(citing Crowell v. Benson, 295 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (explaining that
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the Court will interpret a statute to avoid an unconstitutional
result)).
E. THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE THAT A SINGLE ACT OR OMISSION
WHICH CAUSES DAILY VIOLATIONS OF MULTIPLE PERMIT
CONDITIONS CONSTITUTES MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS EACH OF
WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO PENALTIES
The statutory language and legislative history support the
proposition that a single act or omission that results in multiple
parameter violations causes the discharger to be subject to penal-
ties for each parameter violated on a given day. The canon of stat-
utory interpretation that the inclusion of one means the exclusion
of others is applicable to section 309(b). Other courts' decisions
have been consistent with this interpretation. To decide other-
wise would give permittees a huge incentive to violate all of their
permit conditions in a given day once the permittee has violated
one condition.
Section 309(b) identifies single operational upsets as the ex-
ception to the rule that a single underlying act that causes multi-
ple violations will incur multiple penalties. One rationale offered
for this interpretation is that multiple permitted discharge limits
for a single pollutant are included for separate, distinct purposes.
For instance, in Smithfield Foods, the court determined the daily
maximum effluent limits served to protect against the adverse ef-
fects of large, single releases, while the monthly averages sought
to prevent "chronic effects occurring at lower levels." Smithfield
Foods, 191 F.3d at 527 (citing 972 F. Supp. at 340-42). See also
Natural Res. Def Council v. Texaco Ref & Mktg., Inc., 800 F.
Supp. 1, 20 (D. Del. 1992) (finding mass loading limits and concen-
tration limits of the same parameter each serve a specific regula-
tory function). Thus, violations of daily and monthly limits for the
same pollutant were subject to separate penalties and did not con-
stitute double counting. 191 F.3d at 527. While the Tyson's Food
court rejected this result, its reasoning runs counter to the major-
ity of the courts and to the reasonable interpretation of the
statute.
The Smithfield Foods court's rejection of double-counting, and
other courts' willingness to follow suit, implies that these courts
would be receptive to the argument that violators would not be
subject to separate penalties for each parameter violated where
those parameters are duplicative. In the instant case, NUPEC vi-
olated three permit conditions. Unlike those courts that found
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daily and monthly limits of a single pollutant serve distinct pur-
poses, it has been determined that the intake and non-contact
cooling water conditions in this case actually duplicate the flow
condition. In this permit, each condition does not serve a separate
and distinct purpose.
From a policy perspective, to allow duplicative penalties for
violating duplicative permit conditions allows one violator to be
treated more harshly than others who had the good fortune to
avoid duplicative permit conditions. Additionally, the Court
should find that the intake limit exceeds the scope of the Act;
therefore, NUFFF has no jurisdiction to enforce those violations.
See Issue II, discussed supra.
Congress has delegated to the courts the authority to assess
civil penalties under the CWA. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 425-27 (1987). Courts must exercise their discretion in calcu-
lating such penalties. Id. Therefore, this Court should hold that
NUPEC is subject to daily penalties for exceeding permitted flow
limits only. Summary judgment in favor of NUPEC should be re-
versed, and the case remanded to the trial court to determine the
appropriate penalties. The Court does not need to reach NUPEC's
due process argument because section 309(b), as interpreted by
the majority of the courts, does not on its face cause a fundamen-
tally unfair result, and, as applied to NUPEC in this instance, it is
not determinative since the three permit conditions were found to
be redundant.
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